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Contagious	crowds:	religious	gatherings	in	the	age	of
coronavirus
Governments	have	used	considerable	power	to	restrict	the	freedom	of	their	citizens	as	they	try	to	contain	the
COVID-19	pandemic.	In	particular,	the	temporary	closure	of	places	of	worship	and	restrictions	on	social	gatherings
have	imposed	secular	authority	on	public,	communal	religious	life.	Michal	Kravel-Tovi	(Tel	Aviv
University)	and	Esra	Özyürek	(LSE)	consider	the	tensions	inherent	in	this	collision	of	the	secular	and	religious
realms,	from	the	vilification	of	religious	groups	as	irresponsible	and	dangerous	to	a	future	digital	reordering	of
religious	hierarchy	and	community.
One	of	the	most	compelling	areas	for	social	inquiry	into	the	meanings	and	consequences	of	the	War	on
Coronavirus	is	religious	life.	The	media	presents	us	with	images	of	closed	and	inaccessible	holy	sites,	houses	of
prayer,	and	religious	institutions.	Think	of	the	image	of	Pope	Francis,	leading	the	traditional	Stations	of	the	Cross	in
a	near-empty	Saint	Peter’s	Square	on	Good	Friday;	the	twinned	before-	and	after-coronavirus	satellite
photographs	of	the	Kaaba,	the	Imam	Ali	Shrine,	and	the	Western	Wall;	or	the	numerous	empty	mega-church
auditoriums,	bare	pews	in	local	churches,	and	empty	neighborhood	mosques.	Think	of	the	bakery	in	Rome,	known
for	its	excellent	Easter	pastries	but	now	shuttered;	or	the	streets	of	Bnei	Brak,	the	ultra-Orthodox	city	on	the
outskirts	of	Tel	Aviv,	usually	packed	on	the	days	leading	up	to	Passover	with	residents	kosherising	their	kitchen
utensils	and	dishes	before	the	holiday	–	but	now	empty.
A	church	in	north	London.	Photo:	Ros	Taylor
These	images,	of	empty	public	religious	life,	warrant	closer	scrutiny.	To	begin	with,	this	emptiness	is	a	reality
imposed	by	the	sovereign	state—a	rather	tenuous	achievement	on	its	part,	it	must	be	said.	From	the	outset	of	the
coronavirus	pandemic,	numerous	religious	groups	have	been	identified,	and	vilified,	as	virus	clusters.	Mass
religious	gatherings	and	festivals,	most	notably	of	those	connected	to	religious	enclaves	and	transnational	pilgrims,
have	been	linked	to	infections	and	contagion.	A	Tablighi	Jamaat	gathering	in	Malaysia,	a	mass	meeting	of	the
secretive	sect	of	Shincheonji	Church	of	Jesus	in	South	Korea,	pilgrims	returning	from	the	holy	city	of	Qom	in	Iran	or
from	Mecca,	Saudi	Arabia,	and	ultra-Orthodox	Jews	indulging	in	Purim	celebrations	in	the	USA,	Israel	and	the	UK;
all	have	been	linked,	epidemiologically,	with	the	spread	of	COVID—19.	In	all	of	these	cases,	the	epidemiological
and	scientific	discourses	seem	to	intersect	with	social	stereotypes,	xenophobic	hostility,	and	a	discourse	of
suspicion	directed	towards	foreigners	and	minority	groups	as	being	dangerous	and	possibly	uncontainable
populations.	These	anxious	articulations	conflate	medical	uncertainty	with	moral	panic;	the	danger	of	contagion	with
the	threat	of	symbolic	pollution;	biological	risks	to	public	health	with	threats	to	the	social	and	political	order.
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Nowhere	do	these	forms	of	discursive	conflation	seem	more	intense	and	volatile	than	in	relation	to	the	religious
groups	who	have	breached	the	measures	of	social	distancing	decreed	by	the	state.	Across	religious	denominations
and	faiths,	religious	leaders	and	audiences	have	contested,	negotiated,	and	negated	the	bans	on	gatherings.
Cases	in	point	include	the	Louisiana	pastor	who	hosted	hundreds	of	believers	on	Palm	Sunday;	the	Tampa	pastor
who,	in	an	act	of	defiance	after	his	arrest	for	violating	virus	orders,	broadcast	to	his	congregants	the	message	that
in	closing	the	church	his	objective	was	to	protect	them	“not	from	the	virus,	but	from	tyrannical
government”;	megachurches	in	Nigeria,	closed	down	only	after	the	forceful	intervention	of	the	police;	and	the
numerous	ultra-Orthodox	synagogues,	and	yeshivas,	that,	for	a	while,	resisted	virus	orders.
The	refusal	of	religious	leaders	and	congregations	to	close	their	gates	has	repeatedly	been	framed	in	public
discourse	as	an	outrageous	act	of	civil	disobedience,	a	provocative	marker	of	ill	and	irresponsible	citizenship.	To	be
sure,	secular	public	events	and	leisure	conduct—from	the	now	infamous	Champions	League	tie	between	Atalanta
and	Valencia,	to	the	defiant	Australians	flouting	social-distancing	rules	on	Sydney	beaches—have	been	cited	as
examples	of	less-than-perfect	civil	responsibility.	However,	by	and	large,	religious	communities	are	all-too-easily
identified	and	demonized	by	vast	secular	and	liberal	publics	for	displaying	a	compromised	citizenship,	and	for
favouring	communal	doctrines	and	authorities	over	the	dictates	of	the	state.
Alongside	the	somewhat	exoticising	stories	of	those	who	(allegedly)	fear	God	more	than	they	fear	coronavirus,	or
those	who	offer	alternative,	theologically-based	(whether	messianic	or	apocalyptic)	narratives	about	the	impending
world	catastrophe,	we	are	presented	too	with	broad	coverage	of	religious	groups,	some	more	mainstreamed	than
others,	who	have	refused	to	recognize	liability	and	to	comply	with	the	coronavirus	biosecurity	regime.	The
unavoidable	result,	more	often	than	not,	is	robust	encounter,	and	direct	collision,	between	state	authorities	and	the
religious	community.	These	flash	points	are	manifested	in	the	invasive	inspection	of	bodies,	the	visible	presence	of
military	forces	in	civil	spheres,	financial	penalties,	and	the	enforced	(albeit	belated)	closure	of	religious	institutions.
Underlying	these	collisions	are	divergent	cultural	understandings	of	reality,	authority,	sovereignty,	community,
social	responsibility,	freedom	of	religion,	and	citizenship.	These	all	have	the	potential	to	create	conflicting	construals
and	hierarchies	of	religious	gatherings.	In	Turkey,	for	example,	the	Directorate	of	Religious	Affairs’	solution	between
closing	mosques	for	Friday	prayers	and	helping	COVID—19	to	spread	was	to	institute	VIP	Friday	prayers.	Select
people	close	to	the	government	were	able	to	have	access	to	the	scarce	coronavirus	test	and	could	then	fulfill	their
religious	requirement.	By	doing	so,	the	Turkish	directorate	of	religion	helped	to	establish	inequality	not	only	in	the
wellbeing	of	their	citizens	in	this	world	but	also	in	the	next.	The	question	of	how	and	why—or	indeed,	whether—
public	health	concerns	should	be	prioritized	over	other	considerations,	including	the	mental	wellbeing	and	religious
needs	of	believers,	constitutes	a	loaded	site	for	the	explosive	reconfiguration	of	the	already	extant	cracks	and
tensions	running	between	the	state	and	religious	communities.
The	pandemic	has	not	only	strained	relations	between	the	state	and	religious	communities	but	has	also	brought	out
tensions	within	religious	communities	as	well.	For	example,	in	ultra-Orthodox	Jewish	communities,	one	can	hear	a
growing	swell	of	voices	critical	of	fellow	ultra-Orthodox	Jews	and	even	senior	leaders	who	have	recklessly	breached
or	ignored	state	restrictions.	In	the	UK,	some	religious	figures	publicly	resented	the	Anglican	church	closures.
These	critiques	build	on,	and	elevate,	existing	conflicts	and	fractures,	between	the	more	modern,	mainstream	and
state-oriented	religious	actors	and	those	from	the	more	isolationist,	and	often	radical,	fringes.
This	generalised	set	of	problematisations	regarding	an	ongoing	reality—in	fact,	multiple	realities—opens	up	a	wide
range	of	questions	about	religious	gatherings	in	the	age	of	coronavirus.	What	will	be	the	consequences,	formations,
and	implications	of	disrupted	religious	gatherings?	What	will	it	mean	for	religious	groups	located	on	the	margins	of
the	state	and	the	margins	of	the	global	order?	What	will	this	do	to	transnational	religious	affinities?	If	Saudi	Arabia
decides	pilgrimage	to	Kaaba	is	not	to	be	done	this	year	or	the	next,	how	will	other	Sunni	Muslims	react	to	this
decision?	How	will	emergent	forms	of	digital	gatherings	transform	the	existing	hierarchies	in	religious	communities,
especially	when	not	all	members	are	necessarily	digitally	literate?	What	will	the	implications	be	for	the	financial
maintenance	of	religious	institutions?	Anthropologists	of	religion	will	have	much	to	discover.
This	post	represents	the	views	of	the	authors	and	not	those	of	the	COVID-19	blog,	nor	LSE.	It	first	appeared	on	the
LSE	Religion	&	Global	Society	blog.
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